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Benjamin de Carvalho
Discussion Paper on Operational 
Terminologies and Assessment for 
Multinational Experiment 5 [MNE5]
[Summary and Main Suggestions] This paper discusses obstacles to civil-military cooperation in 
the context of multinational and interagency operations, with a special focus on assessment func-
tions and processes. As such, the paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing process of developing a 
framework for assessment of operations within the context of MNE5. The rationale behind this study 
is to strengthen the basis for and the effectiveness of Effects-Based Assessment (EBA) of perform-
ances, effects, and end-states in multinational and interagency operations. The ﬁrst section starts by 
identifying a set of key overall challenges to such cooperation, namely civilian and military actors’ 
often lack of knowledge of one another’s organizational identities, security concerns, and working 
procedures. The paper then discusses one of these categories, namely working procedures, in more 
detail, identifying in the second section the challenge of divergent operational terminologies, and in 
the third section the challenge of overcoming the information sharing gap when in the presence of 
similar assessment practices. The main suggestion of this paper is that knowledge about civilian and 
military operational terminologies and assessment practices is an imperative for successful civil-
military cooperation in multinational and interagency operations. Such knowledge, we argue, is best 
obtained if both military and civilian actors respectively open their communication channels with the 
purpose of sharing information and operational experiences. Furthermore, based on the discussion, 
the paper raises a number of points which the authors believe would be valuable topics for further 
developing civil-military cooperation within the context of multinational and interagency operations.
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Preface 
 
The nature of international crisis management operations has changed in the 
last decade. Not only have such operations increased in frequency and size, 
but they have also become more complex and involve more and different 
actors in the political planning process and in the field – at the strategic level 
as well as the operational and tactical levels. Indeed, between 2005 and 
2006, the total number of international peacekeeping deployments carried 
out by the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), NATO, the 
African Union (AU), and other regional organizations increased from 
approximately 116,500 to 149,000.1 In addition, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) were increasingly contributing with non-military 
personnel in the field, often alongside the same operation. 
 
Taking the above into consideration, a key stated aim of the Multinational 
Experiment 5 (MNE5)2 is to increase the harmonization between military 
and civilian activities; between international organizations, single states, and 
NGOs involved in multinational and interagency operations. Such efforts 
would, it is argued, be beneficial to both the military and the civilian side.3 
The main objective of the comprehensive approach is to achieve multi-
dimensional and system-wide effects in multinational and interagency 
operations. Furthermore, a more comprehensive approach to multinational 
and interagency operations would also address the problem of overstretched 
capacities for actors such as the UN, NATO, and the United States, as well 
as contributing to improve the overall cost-efficiency and successfulness of 
such operations.  
 
The main aim of this paper is to identify the key challenges to civil-military 
cooperation in the context of multinational and interagency operations. More 
specifically, the paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing process of 
developing a framework for assessment of operations within the context of 
MNE5. The rationale behind such a study is to strengthen the basis for and 
the effectiveness of Effects-Based Assessment (EBA) of performances, 
effects, and end-states in multinational operations. Such improvement, we 
argue, can only be achieved by increasing involved actors’ knowledge about 
one another’s organizational identities, objectives, and standard working 
                                                     
We wish to thank Cedric de Coning, Karsten Friis, Vegard V. Hansen, and Ståle Ulriksen for 
helpful comments, advice and guidance. All faults and omissions remain our own. 
1 Center on International Cooperation, ‘Annual Review of Global Peace Operations’, 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), v. 
2 The purpose of the MNE5 is to investigate the uses of concepts and supporting tools for 
conducting operations in a coalition environment. The experiment is led by the United 
States, with U.S. Joint Forces Command’s (USJFCOM) Joint Experimentation 
Directorate as the executive agent  
3 United States Joint Forces Command, ‘Effects-Based Approach to Multinational 
Operations. Concept of Operations (Conops) with Implementing Procedures’, (Suffolk: 
United States Joint Forces Command, 2006) at 1. 
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procedures. This is particularly true when it comes to operational 
terminologies and assessment practices.  
 
The first part of this paper outlines some general challenges to civil-military 
cooperation in multinational and interagency operations. The second part 
focuses on the conceptual level of such cooperation, demonstrating how 
divergent terminologies can create critical obstacles for communication and 
coordination. The third and final part looks at evaluation practices within the 
UN, similar to those outlined as part of EBAO. Based on an overview of 
Real-Time Evaluations (RTEs), it suggests that knowledge about other 
actors’ standard working procedures in this area is a key premise for 
successful civil-military cooperation, not only in terms of performing 
assessments, but also in terms of developing assessment methodology and 
procedures. 
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1. Civil-military Cooperation in 
Multinational and interagency Operations 
 
While many attempts have been made to improve civil-military cooperation 
in multinational and interagency operations in the past, field studies show 
that de facto cooperation remains inadequate and too ad-hoc. Former studies 
seem to agree on at least three overall challenges to such cooperation, which 
can all be prescribed as resulting from lack of knowledge. 
 
The first challenge has to do with civilian and military actors’ lacking 
knowledge about one another’s organizational identities in the meaning the 
traditions, cultures, images, and fundamental goals that constitute and 
constrain their activities in multinational operations. Indeed, stereotyping 
and prejudices due to lack of knowledge and information about one 
another’s work sometimes represent root obstacles to civil-military 
cooperation. A fundamental point of principle for many humanitarian 
organisations is, for instance, to protect their identities as independent, 
impartial actors when working in the field.4 From such a viewpoint, the 
military can never be seen as either independent or impartial, as they will 
always be constrained by political interests as well as by mission mandates. 
Furthermore, civilian actors have at times argued that the military lacks 
knowledge about and experience on delivering aid, and that they are too 
concerned with mission mandates and logistical questions.5 Another 
frustration that has been expressed by civilian actors is that while the 
military frequently turn to them to get information, they are often reluctant to 
return the favour.  
 
On the military side, the fact that civilian actors are not a homogenous group 
is sometimes neglected. As pointed out by Michael Pugh, a key obstacle to 
closer cooperation in multinational and interagency cooperation is precisely 
“the sheer scale and fragmentation of actors, activities, and perceptions in 
the civilian sector.”6 Indeed, the “jungle” of civilian organisations can 
sometimes make it hard for military actors in the field to keep the various 
organisations and their activities apart. On the overall political level, 
however, military actors acknowledge that the tag “civilian organisations” 
encompasses many different types of actors. In the document “NATO Civil-
Military Co-operation Doctrine”, for instance, NATO distinguishes between 
three principal types of civilian organisations: International organisations 
(IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international and 
                                                     
4 The concepts of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence are for instance among 
the fundamental principles for the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. See 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘Annual Report 2005’, 
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2006). 
5 Thomas Mockhaitis, ‘Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo 
‘, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2004). 
6 Michael Pugh, ‘Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations’, in Jürg M. 
Gabriel Thomas Bernauer, Kurt R. Spillmann, Andreas Wenger (ed.), Peace Support 
Operations. Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives (Bern: Peter Lang, 2001). 
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national government donor agencies. The group of IOs first and foremost 
includes intergovernmentally founded organisations such as the various UN-
agencies, the civilian branches of the EU, and the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).7 Furthermore, the group of NGOs, 
which are usually non-profit based and independent from political control, 
comprises both internationally based NGOs such as Médicins sans Frontières 
(MSF), The Red Cross, Save the Children, and Amnesty International, and 
nationally based NGOs such as Freedom House (US), and Norwegian 
Church Aid (NCA).8 Finally, the group of international and national 
government donor agencies includes for example European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID).9  
 
A second overall challenge to civil-military cooperation is lack of 
knowledge about one another’s security concerns. For civilian actors, the 
always imminent threat of becoming a target in the conflict, sometimes make 
cooperation with the military necessary. In its 2006 annual report, for 
instance, MSF points out how “targeted attacks against aid workers 
including MSF staff, mak[e] land travel and logistical assistance close to 
impossible.”10 At the same time, however, it is often crucial for 
humanitarian actors like the MSF to uphold their impartiality and 
independence in a conflict.11 Too close cooperation with the military may – 
in the worst case – create doubt in the local community regarding the 
organization’s impartiality and neutrality.  
 
For the military, in contrast, the central dilemma is rather the security risk 
connected with sharing operational information with civilian actors. At 
times, civilian personnel have been accused by the military of being too 
naïve about the security risks in conflict areas, and for refusing to fall into 
line with military structures.12 Furthermore, trust and loyalty are key issues 
in this context. If, for instance, the military is to inform civilian actors about 
impending attacks in areas where they are based – for the safety of their field 
workers – it is crucial that they keep this information to themselves. Should 
the civilian actors in question decide to remain loyal to the principle of 
impartiality and therefore inform locals about the attack, they might 
                                                     
7 Nato, ‘Nato Civil-Military Cooperation (Cimic) Doctrine’, (Brussels: NATO, 2003). 
8 It should be noted that the World Bank deliberately has sought to replace the term “NGOs” 
with the broader, more comprehensive term “Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)”. CSOs 
are defined as non-governmental, non-profit organisations “that have a presence in public 
life and express the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, 
cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations”. See World Bank 
Civil Society Team, ‘Consultations with Civil Society’, (Washington D.C: World Bank, 
2007). 
9 Nato, ‘Nato Civil-Military Cooperation (Cimic) Doctrine’. 
10 The issue of security concerns is for instance discussed in Médicins Sans Frontières, 
‘International Activity Report 2006’, (Médicins sans Frontières, 2006). 
11 For a discussion of dilemmas connected to humanitarian space, see Espen Barth Eide et al., 
‘Report on Integrated Missions. Practical Perspectives and Recommendations.’ (Oslo: 
NUPI, 2005). 
12 Mockhaitis, ‘Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo ‘. 
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jeopardize the entire military operation, and put the lives of military 
personnel in danger.  
 
The third and final challenge to civil-military cooperation concerns civilian 
and military actors’ lack of knowledge about one another’s diverging 
working procedures in the planning, action, and assessment-phases of an 
operation. Above all, there are large civil-military as well as intra-civilian 
variations when it comes to defining operational end-goals and establishing a 
working plan for achieving these. As one humanitarian organisation points 
out: “there are more and more aid organisations and agencies involved in the 
business of aid. Many have different values, goals and strategies.”13 In this 
context, two particular aspects should be emphasised: On the planning and 
action level, the lack of convergence between operational terminologies used 
by civilian and military actors represents a major barrier to civil-military 
cooperation. On the assessment level, the great differences between how 
operational processes and outcomes are evaluated and reviewed by civilian 
and military organisations, cause equally tough headaches. These two 
challenges are discussed more thoroughly in the following two sections.  
 
                                                     
13 Médicins Sans Frontières, ‘International Activity Report 2006’. 
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OBJECTIVES 
ACTIONS 
EFFECTS END-STATE 
ASSESSMENTS 
INSTRUMENTS 
Measures of 
Performance 
Measures of 
Effectiveness 
2. The challenge of divergent operational 
terminologies 
 
It has been argued that the use of divergent language and terminology 
constitute “potential communication obstacles between agencies, set[ting] 
the stage for considerable misunderstanding and miscommunication.”14 As 
Susanna P. Campbell and Michael Hartnett point out, there are large 
variations not only between the operational terminologies that are used by 
military and civilian actors, but also within the large and complex group of 
civilian actors. 
 
Yet, despite these realizations, a standardisation of operational terminologies 
is most likely not a realistic solution to this challenge. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine military personnel making use of conceptual frameworks developed 
by civilian actors or vice versa. In addition, and due to the large military-
civilian as well as intra-civilian differences when it comes to planning, 
working procedures, and end-goals, it is doubtful that such overall concepts 
would even be meaningful or adequate in the field. A more useful step in this 
context, therefore, is to increase the various actors’ knowledge about each 
other’s use of operational terminologies. Yet, such a mapping presumes a 
basic starting point as regards the various phases of a multinational and 
interagency operation. The following sections are thus based on the 
categorization of operational phases as described in the MNE5 CONOPS.15 
Operational Phases as Defined in MNE5 CONOPS  
 
Figure 1 below illustrates the abovementioned phases. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 Susanna P. Campbell and Michael Hartnett, ‘A Framework for Improved Coordination: 
Lessons Learned from the International Development, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, 
Humanitarian and Conflict Resolution Communities’, (Washington D.C.: Interagency 
Transformation, Education, & Analysis Program, 2005). 
15 United States Joint Forces Command, ‘Effects-Based Approach to Multinational 
Operations. Concept of Operations (Conops) with Implementing Procedures’. 
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As illustrated in the figure, objectives – in the meaning desired effects or 
end-state to be achieved by the actions taken – are formulated in the initial 
phase. On the basis of these objectives, actions – the general “doings” and 
practices that are required to achieve these effects or end-state – are carried 
out. Furthermore, instruments refer to the practical and specific methods 
through which these actions are in fact being accomplished. The actions 
taken by way of these instruments will in turn lead to effects – defined as the 
short-term direct and indirect consequences that are caused by one or more 
actions or, alternatively, by other preceding effects. In a long-term 
perspective, the actions and effects conclude into an end-state, which refers 
to the final result when the implementation of actions is seen as completed, 
and/or one or more of the initial objectives have been achieved. At the same 
time as the various phases of the operations is being carried out, assessment 
is taking place. Assessment can here be defined as evaluating the degree to 
which the actions taken are being successful or not (Measures of 
Performance) and/or the degree to which the desired effects are being 
achieved or not (Measures of Effects).16  
 
Operational Terms used by Civilian and Military Actors 
 
Figure 2 (above) gives a general overview of some variations in these 
operational terminologies (the proposed CONOPS-terms in brackets). 
Making an all- embracing a detailed overview over the operational 
terminologies used by specific actors involved in multinational operations is 
a more challenging task. Not only would the process of data collection be 
time-consuming due to the large number of actors and information which 
exists, but the large internal variations even within one and the same 
organisation would also challenge the reliability of the findings.17 
                                                     
16 Ibid. 
17 Reliability refers her to the stability, accuracy, and reproducibility of empirical findings. 
Kristin M. Haugevik and Benjamin de Carvalho 12 
Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actions 
Activities 
Conduct 
Efforts 
Implementation
Input 
Procedure 
Practice 
Intervention 
Initiatives 
Execution Effects 
Benchmarks 
Milestones 
Implications 
Impacts 
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Outcomes 
Results 
Achievements 
Output 
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[OBJECTIVES] 
[EFFECTS] 
[ASSESSMENT] 
[END-STATE] 
| Assessment | Evaluation | Monitoring | 
[INSTRUMENTS
Objectives 
Goals 
Aims 
Purposes 
Incentives 
Priorities 
Ambitions 
Plans 
Target 
Mission 
[ACTIONS]
| Lessons learned | Feedback | Review | 
Measures of  
Effectiveness 
Measures of 
Performance 
Instruments 
Means 
Assets 
Skills 
Procedures 
Tasks 
Tools 
Methods 
Capabilities 
Resources 
[OPERATION] 
| Operation | Campaign | Mission | Response | Intervention | 
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Operational Terms used by Selected Civilian and Military 
Actors 
 
The overview presented in figure 3 is therefore not intended to be exhaustive 
either in terms of the actors or the concepts and terms included. 18 Rather, it 
offers a basic illustration of the complex universe of operational terms  used 
by a sample of military and civilian actors. For the purpose of demonstrating 
diversity and range, we have chosen one exclusively military actor (NATO); 
one actor with both civilian and military capabilities (the EU); three 
coordinators of humanitarian assistance (the Inter Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and 
the World Bank), and two international non-governmental organisations (the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and MSF).  
 
For each organisation, key formal documents have been selected based on 
relevance, and significance. Nevertheless, as all sources are not made public, 
especially military sources, the analysis relies exclusively on those sources 
available in the public domain. The data collection is based on electronic 
searches on a large selection of keywords in key official documents, in 
combination with close reading of a selection of these documents.  
 
                                                     
18 The analysis has been based on the following documents: Nato, Nato’s Strategic Concept 
(Brussels, 1999), Nato, Nato Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and 
Press, 2001), Nato, ‘Nato Civil-Military Cooperation (Cimic) Doctrine’. European 
Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy’, (Brussels, 
2003), European Council, ‘Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of Esdp’, (Brussels, 2004), 
Europan Commission, ‘A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector 
Reform’, (Brussels, 2006), European Council, ‘Council Joint Action 2003/92/Cfsp on the 
European Union Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 
(Brussels, 2003), European Council, ‘Council Joint Action 2004/570/Cfsp on the 
European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina ‘, (Brussels, 2004), 
Europan Council, ‘Council Joint Action 2003/423/Cfsp on the European Union Military 
Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, (Brussels, 2003). Inter Agency 
Standing Committee (Iasc), ‘Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters. Iasc 
Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and International Disasters’, (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2006). Inter Agency Standing 
Committee (Iasc), ‘Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters. Iasc Operational 
Guidelines on Human Rights and International Disasters’. Inter Agency Standing 
Committee (Iasc), ‘Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters. Iasc Operational 
Guidelines on Human Rights and International Disasters’ International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘Annual Report 2005’, International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluation’, (1st 
edition edn.; Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 
2002) Médicins Sans Frontières, ‘International Activity Report 2006’. World Bank, 
‘World Bank Annual Report 2006’, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2006). United 
Nations Development Programme (Undp) Development Office, ‘Handbook on 
Monitoring. Evaluating for Results’, (New York: UNDP, 2002) 
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Figure 3: 
 
Variations vis-à-vis MNE5 CONOPS 
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Actions 
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As we can see, there are large variations in operational terminologies not 
only between the various organisations, but also within them. For instance, 
while “operation” and “mission” generally seems to be accepted terms in 
most organisations, “response” is primarily used in a civilian context. 
Similarly, NATO is alone in utilising the term “campaign”, most likely due 
to its military connotations. Still, the largest variations in terminologies are 
to be found in the table’s right half, in relation to the categories labelled 
“effects”, “end-states”, and “assessment”. When it comes to effects, these 
are by many organisations described as “impact”. Other variations include 
“implications”, “benchmarks”, and “initial results”. Interestingly, however, 
none of the documents examined contain a reference to the term “effect” 
itself. Furthermore, it should be noted that neither of these terms appear 
frequently. This suggests that the concept of “effects-based-operations” so 
far exists primarily at the discussion-level, and that the mapping of short-
term direct and indirect consequences remain limited in many organisations.  
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Similarly, the ways and extent to which actions and effects are evaluated 
also vary greatly between organizations. While practically all the 
organizations examined have terminologies for both in-process-evaluation 
(“assessment”, “evaluation”, “monitoring”) and retrospective evaluation 
(“review”, “lessons learned”), there are clear differences in terms of how 
these were interpreted and referred to. A general trend is that the civilian 
actors examined (with the notable exception of the EU) are more detailed in 
their descriptions of how such evaluation, assessment, and monitoring 
processes are to take place. Suggestively, many of these have even 
developed handbooks designed specifically for evaluating their own actions 
and obtained effects when taking part in such operations. This is discussed in 
more detail in the following section. 
 
Discussion Points 
 
 Is a standardization of terminology between civilian and military actors 
necessary, or even possible? 
 Does the MNE 5 CONOPS terminology adequately cover all phases of 
an operation, or should another terminology, for instance that of OECD 
DAC be used as a starting point? 
 Is it necessary to distinguish between process assessment and end-state 
assessment? 
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3. Learning from Similar Practices:  
Effects-Based Assessment and Real-Time 
Evaluations 
 
One of the key conclusions from earlier MNEs, especially MNE 4, was that 
assessment of the ongoing campaign (Effects-Based Assessment, or EBA) 
was a crucial element of EBAO, it was suggested that developing a coherent 
approach to EBA be a major part of MNE 5. Thus, MNE5 CONOPS places 
great emphasis on the importance of assessing the effects (EBA) of ongoing 
operations. 
 
More specifically, the EBA is meant to couple the question ‘are things being 
done right?’ with the question ‘are the right things being done?’ in a 
continuous process of assessment designed to determine whether (1) 
progress towards the end-state, (2) the creation of effects, and (3) whether 
actions are being undertaken. The process employs a variety of measures, 
quantitative as well as qualitative, in order to measure progress through 
measurement of so-called Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), Measures of 
Performance (MOP), Measures of Effectiveness-Measures of Performance 
Analysis, and Qualitative Campaign Evaluation. These characteristics make 
the method of measurement of progress unique, in the sense that it is not 
modelled directly on any single archetype of existing assessment practices. 
Developing a novel mode of assessment is a challenge, especially when 
there are few similar existing military practices to lean on. 
 
However, the continuous assessment of ongoing operations with a view to 
redefine the operation according to whether benchmarks (or “effects”)are 
met, is an established practice in the civilian sector, especially in the area of 
disaster relief and complex humanitarian emergencies. Three practices are 
especially relevant to the process of developing EBA, namely those of 
monitoring, performance monitoring, and Reat-Time Evaluation (RTE). 
 
Monitoring, Performance Monitoring, and Real-Time 
Evaluation 
 
Monitoring is generally defined as  
 
A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified 
indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an 
ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of 
progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of 
allocated funds.19 The function of monitoring is generally undertaken by 
members of the organization itself, and while the operation is ongoing.  
                                                     
19 See OECD DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation (2002) “Glossary of Key Terms in 
Evaluation and Results Based Management.” Paris: OECD Publications, p. 28 
Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational and Interagency Operations 17 
 
However, monitoring does not to the same extent as EBA have a clear focus 
on feedback in order to readjust the course of actions taken. This, however, 
is more clearly the case with performance monitoring, which is generally 
defined as “A continuous process of collecting and analyzing data to 
compare how well a project, program, or policy is being implemented 
against expected results.”20 
 
However, the practice which most resembles the EBA, and as such also the 
one one could draw most insights from, is the practice of Real-Time 
Evaluation. Unlike EBA, RTE has no specified methodology. However, the 
practices are similar to EBA in that they both take place during an operation, 
are reiterative, and that their results are being fed back into the planning of 
the operation in order to readjust the course towards the achievement of the 
desired impacts (“effects”).  
 
RTEs are defined in the UN system as “an evaluation carried out whilst an 
emergency response program is in full implementation”21 or  
 
A timely, rapid and interactive peer-review of fast evolving humanitarian 
operation (usually an emergency) undertaken at an early phase. Its broad 
objective is to cause the effectiveness and impact of a given […] 
response, and to ensure that its findings are used as an immediate catalyst 
for organizational and operational change.22 
 
While the practice is similar to that of monitoring, it nevertheless defies 
“conventional categorization of activities as monitoring or evaluation” by 
combining the two in the ongoing operation. 23 While monitoring has 
traditionally concentrated on tracking progress, and evaluations on making 
judgments ex-post, the RTE attempts to bridge the two, and incorporate 
lessons learned and their evaluations into the operation itself, through 
ongoing monitoring and feedback. As such, conceptually, the practice is very 
similar, and therefore also relevant to, to the assessment outlined with 
respect to EBAO. As such, an RTE is a dynamic tool allowing to “assess and 
adjust” the response by providing immediate inputs into an ongoing 
operation. The RTE is thus intended to “reinforce the link between 
operations, evaluation and policy formulation.”24 
                                                     
20 See OECD DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation (2002) “Glossary of Key Terms in 
Evaluation and Results Based Management.” Paris: OECD Publications, p. 28 
21 UNICEF, OCHA, WFP (2006) “Real Time Evaluation Draft Concept Paper”, 05 June 
2006 
22 UNICEF, OCHA, WFP (2006) “Real Time Evaluation Draft Concept Paper”, 05 June 
2006 
23 Maurice Herson and John Mitchell (2005), “Real-Time Evaluation: where does its value 
like?” in Humanitarian Exchange no. 32 (December). 
24 Arafat Jamal and Jeff Crisp, (2002) Real-Time Humanitarian Evaluations: Some 
Frequently Asked Questions. (EPAU/2002/05) Geneva, UNHCR Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis Unit (EPAU), May 2002 
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Real-Time Evaluation in the UN system: A Brief Overview 
 
While evaluations of humanitarian emergency assistance programs where 
rare only 15 years ago, it is today widely used by a number of civilian 
organisation involved in the provision of disaster relief. Simultaneously, 
there has been an evolution in the ways in which these agencies have 
evaluated their programs and the impact of these programs. Thus, rather than 
seeing only ex-post evaluations, so-called real-time evaluations (RTE) have 
become more and more common. 
 
While the first references to real-time evaluation in the humanitarian aid 
literature did not appear until 1998, the need for such a practice was already 
in 1992 emphasized by the UNHCR after a conventional evaluation of the 
Persian Gulf crisis.25 In 1999, as the UNHCR’s performance in the Kosovo 
operation received considerable criticism, the issue of real-time validation 
once again became salient. Thus, the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit 
(EPAU) of the UNHCR issued a provisional framework for real-time 
emergency validations. This practice has since been undertaken in a number 
of operations the UNHCR has been involved in. It has also become common 
practice with a number of actors involved in the humanitarian sector.26 
RTE Methodology and Challenges 
 
Although the practices of RTE varies across agencies, there are nevertheless 
a number of common characteristics defining the method. Firstly, the RTE 
takes place during the course of the operation. Secondly, it is an iterative 
process rather than a once off operation. Thirdly, it focuses on short term, 
rather than long-term results, and as such it’s time frame is short. Fourthly, it 
is heavily focused on field visits combined with headquarter meetings, rather 
than relying on secondary literature. Finally, RTEs have a greater emphasis 
on the immediate lesson learning rather than full accountability, thus 
enabling the rapid results obtained to change the program or operation and 
mid-course rather than waiting for an ex-post evaluation.27 
 
One of the key challenges to be met in multinational and interagency 
operations today is that many of these assessment practices, and indeed the 
theorizing around them, exist side by side, without the actors involved being 
cognisant of one another’s working methods. This lack of knowledge may 
                                                     
25 J. Crisp et. al, reviewed UNHCR emergency preparedness and response in the Persian Gulf 
crisis (GULD/EVAL/12, Rev. 1), UNHCR Geneva, March 1992. 
26 The UNHCR has been involved in RTEs in Southern Africa, Eritrea and Sudan; The 
World Food Program  (WFP) in Southern Africa (2002-2003), and with the Indian Ocean 
tsunami; The UNICEF in Liberia (2003), and Niger (2005); The International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in Southern Africa 2002; OCHA in 
Darfur (2004), and Pakistan (2006); (2000) DFID and IFRC have also been involved in a 
common RTE in India. 26 See Peta Sandison (2003) Desk Review of Real-Time 
Evaluation Experience [Evaluation Working Paper]. New York: UNICEF 
27 See the discussion by Herson and Mitchell in Maurice Herson and John Mitchell (2005), 
“Real-Time Evaluation: where does its value like?” in Humanitarian Exchange no. 32 
(December). 
Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational and Interagency Operations 19 
cause two problems. First, that lessons learned from similar practices are not 
taken into account when developing new methods for assessment. Secondly, 
that assessments undertaken by different actors in parallel do not address the 
same issues, and as such may not be used by other actors involved. Indeed, 
in order for assessments to be useful and successful, it is essential that they 
are undertaken in close cooperation with all parties involved in an operation. 
Knowledge of similar practices can help facilitate the coordination of 
monitoring, evaluation, and assessment exercises between civilian and 
military actors involved in the same operation. 
EBA and RTE: Lessons to be Learned?  
 
RTEs may therefore be seen as very useful in further developing and testing 
the EBA framework, as they can provide not only lessons learned input, but 
also suggestions as to avenues along which an “interface” enabling more 
compatible assessments between civilian and military actors can be 
developed. The need for such cooperation and compatibility is also increased 
because of the emphasis placed by the EBAO on the social system as 
whole.28 Hence, it is important that the many actors involved in the 
operations have, if not common and standardized methods for accessing 
ongoing operations, then at least a common understanding of the different 
ways in which these assessments are undertaken by the different actors. 
 
Given the similarity of the approaches to assessing an ongoing operation, 
there are a few avenues along which the practice of RTE may help develop a 
more effective EBA.29 Similar to EBA, RTEs are undertaken in order to 
remedy to three things in an ongoing operation, namely effectiveness, 
efficiency, and the impact of the operation. In order to do this, the UNHCR 
emphasizes, RTEs must analyze the response both on the basis of a number 
of general benchmarks, ranging from general mandates, policy statements, 
and on the basis of the specific objectives of the operation in question. 
Furthermore, flexibility in the design of the format of the evaluation rather 
than a “one format fits all” concept has the advantage of making RTEs 
malleable for different operations.30  
 
As the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD emphasize 
that the greater fluidity of the context and the complexity and 
interrelatedness of the respondents system to complex emergencies 
“reduce[d] […] the value and effectiveness of project evaluation techniques 
which require the separation of cause and effect. Explanation based on the 
                                                     
28 A “system-of-systems” approach, used in Knowledge Development, which considers 
groups of organized resources, methods, and procedures that are regulated by interaction 
or interdependence to accomplish specific goals (see MNE 5 CONOPS Glossary). 
29 On a cautionary note, it must be emphasized that the two methods diverge somewhat, 
especially as assessment of ongoing operation in EBO is an intrinsic part of the operation 
itself and as such undertaken on a continuous basis, whereas RTEs, although evaluating 
an ongoing operation, are nevertheless limited in time. 
30 UNICEF, OCHA, WFP (2006) “Real Time Evaluation Draft Concept Paper”, 05 June 
2006 
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separation of cause from effect is often not possible in complex systems 
composed of numerous interdependent relationships where the direction of 
influence may well be circular rather than linear.” As such, OECD DAC 
emphasize that methods “more common in historical or philosophical 
research are often more productive than those traditionally employed in the 
social sciences.” These methods, they argue, capture “the complexity and 
interdependent nature of events in the real world and ask not, ‘did x cause 
y?’ But rather, ‘what happened?’ And ‘why?’” OECD DAC thus conclude 
that “in order to understand and to be able to do with institutions and 
structures,” one ought “to build narratives about specific events and 
processes, rather than theorizing grandly and establishing causal 
relationships.”31 
 
While the methodology employed in an RTE will have to depend on the 
operation assessed, there is nevertheless a sense in which, as emphasized by 
the UNHCR “whereas conventional evaluations tend to look at specific 
situations and look for general conclusions, RTEs will reverse this process 
somewhat: the RTE team will be aware of such general lessons, and will 
seek to assess their relevance to specific situations.” Furthermore, one needs 
to be a ware of the fact that the narrow focus upon the ongoing operations 
often may result in an absence of a system wide perspective. As Peta 
Sandison argues in a report for the UNICEF, the main drawbacks of RTEs is 
that RTEs “may overemphasize what is essentially a snapshot of a fast-
moving situation; the picture lending too much weight to ephemera and 
becoming hard to subsequently shake off.”32 
 
With respect to the selection of the evaluation personnel, the UN experience 
indicates that as the aim of the evaluation may not be clear from the onset, 
the participants in the RTE may often experience some degree of confusion 
in the initial phase of an evaluation. As such, it is emphasized that “good 
interpersonal skills, a sound understanding of operational systems and 
culture, and an ability to carry a participatory methods” where important in 
an evaluation team, and that the most highly valued contribution in these 
ongoing evaluations was “experience from other contexts” which the paper 
argues brought “creative thinking” to the evaluation. 33 Unlike that which is 
the case, evaluators in RTEs are often from outside of the organization. As to 
the composition of RTE team is a draft paper suggests that the variation 
would ideally be undertaken by small teams composed of two or three 
evaluators, one team leader with extensive experience in the necessary 
evaluation expertise, and the other is having the necessary technical 
specialization. 34  
                                                     
31 OECD/DAC (1999) Guidance for evaluating humanitarian assistance in complex 
emergencies.  
32 See Peta Sandison (2003) Desk Review of Real-Time Evaluation Experience [Evaluation 
Working Paper]. New York: UNICEF 
33 UNICEF, OCHA, WFP (2006) “Real Time Evaluation Draft Concept Paper”, 05 June 
2006 
34 UNICEF, OCHA, WFP (2006) “Real Time Evaluation Draft Concept Paper”, 05 June 
2006 
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Discussion Points 
 
 To what extent should assessment methodology lean towards being 
quantitative or qualitative? 
 Should assessment teams be internal (military), mixed (military and 
civilian), external (civilian), or a combination? 
 To what extent can EBA be improved through learning lessons from 
civilian evaluation practices such as Performance Monitoring or Real-
Time Evaluation? 
 How can EBA be made compatible with existing civilian assessment 
practices in such a way as to be able to include data and analysis from 
other actors in the MOE-MOP Analysis?  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The present paper is meant as a contribution to an ongoing discussion about 
civil-military cooperation in multinational and interagency operations. Due 
to its limited scope, the paper does not seek to be definitive in the field, but 
rather to be a starting point to a more general discussion about civilian and 
military cooperation, and also a more specific commentary on the ongoing 
discussion about Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) in the 
context of MNE. 
 
While the challenges ahead are many in terms of achieving full cooperation 
at all levels and phases of any operation, we nevertheless suggest that 
information sharing and knowledge of other actors’ terminology and 
working practices is a precondition for successful cooperation between 
military and civilian actors.  
 
Military actors must know how the different civilian parties work, their 
perceptions of the situation, their principles, and vice-versa. Cooperation 
also requires that involved parties be aware of the terminology used by other 
actors. Furthermore, where practices are similar, civilian and military parties 
must share knowledge about their experiences, such as between Effects-
Based Assessment (EBA) and Real-Time Evaluation (RTE). Such 
information sharing can greatly reduce the risk of repeating the same 
mistakes, as well as improve the design of future working methods and 
procedures. 
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Appendix: Abbreviations 
 
 
AU African Union 
CIMIC Civil-military Cooperation 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
DFID Department for International Development 
EBA Effects-Based Assessment 
EBAO Effects-Based Approach to Operations 
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
EU European Union 
IFRC The International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies  
IO International organisation 
MNE5 Multinational Experiment 5 
MSF Médicins Sans Frontières / Doctors Without 
Borders 
MOE Measures of Effectiveness 
MOP Measures of Performance 
IASC Inter Agency Standing Committee 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OECD/DAC Development Assistance Committee of the OECD 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe 
RTE Real-Time Evaluation 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UN United Nations 
WB World Bank 
WFP World Food Program 
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